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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 2090471 -CA

TIMOTHY LAMOREAUX,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this case involving first degree felony convictions
entered in a court of record and transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, by virtue of
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. May an officer testify using an out of court statement when that officer has
testified that the out of court statement does not assist his memory of the events to
which he is testifying?
Whether evidence constitutes hearsay is a question of law that we review for
correctness. Benitez v. Department of Health, 20080957-CA (UT App 2009).
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, unless it involves a legal question, which is reviewed for
correctness. McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant:
1.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.

2.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c).
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

3.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory.
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of
testifying, either (1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its
discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is
entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine
the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to
the testimony of the witness.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Timothy Lamoreaux appeals from a jury trial conviction of distribution or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone in violation of § 58-378(l)(A)(ii).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court

On January 6, 2009, Appellant was convicted of Distribution or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone. After completion of trial, appellant
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was sentenced on April 29, 2009. Subsequent to being sentenced, appellant filed a notice
of appeal on May 26, 2009.
C.

Statement of the Facts

At the jury trial, in January 2009, the State of Utah called three witnesses, Officer
Shane Sorensen, the investigating officer, Michael Hepworth, a chemist from the Utah
Crimes Lab, and Suzanne Ruesch, a co-defendant. The defense did not call any
witnesses.
Officer Sorensen testified that he responded to a phone call about illegal parking.
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 5, 2009, at pg. 63. During the course of
his testimony, Officer Sorensen had a police report in front of him and repeatedly refered
to the report for information about the events of the evening in question. Id, at 65, 67, 80,
81, 82, and 83 [this list of the officer's references to his report is not intended to be
inclusive of all such references but is included to show the Court the extent to which the
officer relied on his notes to testify]. As the officer walked around the area where the
report originated he observed the defendant and another male talking to three individuals,
two adult females and one child, in a vehicle. Id, at 64-65. As he approached the officer
saw the defendant hand something to the driver of the vehicle, Suzanne Ruesche. Id, at
67. The officer testified that he arrested the defendant and then interviewed the
occupants of the vehicle including Ms. Ruesche, searched her vehicle and found
methamphetamine. Id, at 67-71.
The officer then stated that he interviewed the defendant about his involvement,
both on the scene and later at the jail. Id, at 77-78. The officer testified that the
defendant repeatedly denied any involvement with the methamphetamine. Id, at 78-79.
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The officer testified that at the jail, after the defendant again denied involvement,
that "he did make some incriminating statements." Id, at 79-80. When asked to describe
what the defendant said, the officer testified, after referring to his report to refresh his
memory that defendant did "admit that he was involved in making the arrangements to
distribute methamphetamine." Id, at 81. However, the State continued to try to get the
officer to recall what "incriminating statements" the defendant made, Id, at 81-83, during
which the officer repeatedly asked to refer to his report. The State finally asked, "What
about what he said indicated to you that he had been involved with this drug deal?" Id, at
82. The officer again requested to "refer to his report," and asked the Court, "Can I refer
to my report and read that specifically?" Id, at 83. At this time defense counsel objected,
stating that due to the repeated failure to have his memory refreshed by the report, that
any answer would be hearsay. Id. The Court responded by stating, "The next question is
whether or not reading the report. .. does, in fact, refresh his memory." Id. The State
then specifically asked, "Does that report refresh your memory about what Mr.
Lamoreaux said to you that night?" to which the officer stated, "To be honest, no, it
doesn't." Id.
Following presentation of evidence, defense counsel moved for those parts of
Officer Sorensen's testimony regarding the "incriminating statements" be struck, or that
an instruction be given the jury to ignore those portions of the officer's testimony as they
were hearsay. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 6, 2009, at pg. 7-9. The
court denied the motion, stating, "I think it just goes to the weight. And that's how I will
rule." Id, at 9.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court should find error where the trial court failed to give an instruction to
the jury stating that Officer Sorensen's testimony that the defendant had confessed should
not have been considered. This Court should find that Officer Sorensen's testimony as it
relates to the defendant's confession was inadmissible hearsay as it was apparent from
the witness's own statement, that he was transmitting to the jury the contents of his report
and not the contents of his memory. Bridges v. Candland, 54 P.2d 842, 847 (Utah 1936),
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING SOME CORRECTIVE
ACTION WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT OFFICER SORENSEN WAS
INTRODUCING HEARSAY ONTO THE RECORD THROUGH THE GUISE
OF REFRESHING HIS MEMORY.
A,

Relevant Law

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trail or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Utah R.
ofEvid. 801(c). While Utah practice and Rule 612 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allow
for a witness to use almost anything to "refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of
testifying," Utah R. ofEvid, 612, "care must be exercised by the [trial] court to see that
such instrument is serving the function merely of starting the recollective processes in
action." Bridges, 54 P.2d, at 846.
In Bridges v. Candland, there was a dispute over a contract. Id, at 842-846.
During the trial a witness testified as to his understanding of the events surrounding
certain ambiguities in a contract, which witness was then cross-examined in a manner
that cast doubt onto his testimony during direct. Id, at 845-846. On redirect the witness
was provided with an affidavit from an opposition witness, which affidavit had been
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refused admission by the court, and "was apparently permitted to sit before the jury and
'refresh his recollection' by reading largely from the document, against the objection of
plaintiff." Id, at 846.
In analyzing "refreshing a recollection," the Supreme Court of Utah stated,
"refreshing a recollection is not equivalent to reading from a document," and "care must
be exercised by the court to see that such instrument is serving the function merely of
starting the recollective processes in action." Id. The Court then held, "[the] objection
was well taken. Any statements of [the affidavit] of the nature offered . .. were hearsay."
Id, at 847.
This counsel has not been able to find any direction from either the Court of
Appeals of Utah, or the Utah Supreme Court, as to how district court judges are supposed
to carry out the mandate given in Bridges that "care must be exercised by the court to see
that such instruments [are] serving the function . . . of... starting the recollective
processes." Id, at 846. However, in Corpus Juris Secundum [CJS], a survey of
jurisdictions in the United States provides the following rules and guidance as to
implementing the "Refreshing Memory" principle. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 438 (June
2009). The CJS supports the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Bridges saying, "the
court must determine whether the witness is testifying from the writing or from
recollection, and whether refreshing recollection is a mere subterfuge to improperly
suggest to the witness the testimony that is expected." Id. The CJS goes on to state that a
foundation must be laid before a memory may be refreshed in that memory should not be
refreshed until "it appears that the aid of this writing is necessary." Once a memory has
been refreshed, "a witness may testify as to matters about which memory has been
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refreshed if the testimony is from a present and independent recollection," and "the
witness must testify to the facts as remembered from the refreshed recollection, without
the aid of the writing, and may not read or show the writing to the jury or state what the
writing says or shows." Id.
B.

Application of Law to Facts

In the present case, Officer Sorensen testified with a copy of the police report in
his hands throughout the entirety of his testimony. Officer Sorensen referred to his report
throughout, and made a record that his testimony was coming from his report on at least
six [6] times. At a critical point in his testimony the officer was unable to recall what, if
any, "incriminating statements" were made by the defendant without referring to his
report. Then when asked pointedly, "Does that report refresh your memory about what
Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?" the officer stated, "To be honest, no, it doesn't."
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 5, 2009, at pg. 83.
Throughout the officer's testimony the court exercised no care to see that the
report was being used for the limited function of starting the recollective process. When
objection was raised to the repeated use of the report, the court agreed that the witness
needed to respond to the foundational question of "whether or not reading the report
does, in fact, refresh his memory." Id. However, even though the officer testified that
"To be honest, no, it doesn't," Id, the court took no efforts to rectify the situation, when
asked to do so by defense counsel, as the court held, "I think it just goes to the weight.
And that's how I will rule." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 6, 2009, at
Pg.9.
Officer Sorensen repeatedly referred to his report without any foundation that he
needed his memory refreshed. Officer Sorensen read facts from the report without ever
-7-

testifying that the report had refreshed his memory as to those facts. The court allowed
the officer to testify from the report without exercising any care that the testimony was
from an independent recollection of the facts to which the officer was testifying. And
then, following an objection by defense counsel, when the officer testified honestly and
clearly that the report had not refreshed his memory as to anything said to the officer by
the defendant on the night in question, the court refused to correct the error as requested
by defense counsel.
C.

This Court Should Correct the Error

Because the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony through the guise of
refreshing the witnesses memory, this Court should reverse the defendant's conviction
and order that a new trial be held in this matter.
Furthermore, because neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Utah has
provided any procedural guidance to assist the trial courts with the mandate that "care
must be exercised by the court to see that such instruments [are] serving the function . . .
of starting the recollective processes," Bridges, at 846, this Court should find that the
procedural protections set forth in the CJS should become the standard in Utah courts.
This Court should provide guidance in that before any witness may refer to a hearsay
document for the purpose of refreshing her memory, that witness must testify as to what
their current recollection is, and it must appear that the use of the document is necessary.
Additionally, before the witness is then allowed to testify as to their refreshed memory,
that witness must be able to testify under oath that their memory has been refreshed and
that they are testifying from a present independent recollection of the event. This Court
should also find that any testimony that appears to be the use of memory refreshing that
does not conform to this standard is inadmissible.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should find that the trial court erred in denying a curative instruction
when Officer Sorensen testified from his report that the defendant confessed to
involvement in arranging to distribute methamphetamine when, in fact, Officer Sorensen
later testified that he had no independent recollection of such a confession. The Court
should therefore reverse appellant's conviction and remand the case for another trial. The
Court should also provide procedural guidance as to how witnesses' memories are
properly refreshed by otherwise inadmissible documents.

Respectfully submitted this jy

day of J

LSA^L^

, 2009

MCKAY G KING
Counsel for Appellant, Timothy Lamoreaux
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ADDENDUM
1.

Bridges v. Candland, 54 P.2d 842, 847 (Utah 1936)

2.

98 C.J.S. Witnesses §438

3.

Reporter's Transcript ofProceedings, January 5, 2009 Pages 63,64,65,67,68,69,70,71,77,78,79,80,81,82,83.

4.

Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 6, 2009 Pages 7,8,9
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Vestlaw
Page I

i P.2d 842
8 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842
;C«tc as: 88 Utah 373,54 I\2d 842)

Supreme Court of Utah.
S. W. BRIDGES & CO.

tween what defendants received and what wool was
sold for held inadmissible as stating conclusion.
Evidence I57€=>242(l)

CANDLAND et al.
No, 5386.

Appeal from District Court, Sanpete Count)', Seventh
District; Dilworlh Woolley, Judge,
Action by S. W. Bridges & Company against W. D.
Candland and others, doing business as W. D. Candland & Sons. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff
appeals.
Judgment set aside and new trial granted.
West Headnotes
Evidence 157 €=>200
157 Evidence
157V1I Admissions
157VIKA) Nature, Form, and Incidents in
General
1S7k200 k. Nature and Grounds for Admission in General. Most Cited Cases
Admissions must generally be as to facts.
Evidence 157 €=>241(l)
157 Evidence
I57VJI Admissions
157VIUD) By Agents or Other Representatives
157k240 Agents or Employees
157k24l In General
157k24l(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In action for amount due on contract whereunder
plaintiff" was to self woof belonging to defendants,
who were to pay expenses thereof, testimony as to
statement of plaintiffs agent to effect that expenses
of handling wool were to come out of difference be-

157 Evidence
157V1I Admissions
157VIUP) By Agents or Other Representatives
157k240 Agents or Employees
J57k242 Scope and Extent of Agency
or Employment
157k242< I) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Opinion of agent involving consciousness of liability
or fault is admissible against principal as admission
only where made within scope of agent's authority.
Evidence 157 €=>242(I)
157 Evidence
157VII Admissions
I57V1KP) By Agents or Other Representatives
157k240 Agents or Employees
157k242 Scope and Extent of Agency
or Employment
)57k242(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In action on contract whereunder plaintiff was to sell
wool belonging to defendants, who were to pay expenses thereof with interest on advances by plaintiff,
statements of agent of plaintiff that plaintiff had
failed to carry out contract and caused loss to defendant held not admissible as admissions of plaintiff
since not within authority of agent.
Evidence 157 0= > 441(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157X1(0 Separate or Subsequent Oral
Agreement
157U440 Prior and Contemporaneous Collateral Agreements
157k44l In General

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

54P.2d842
88 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842
(Cite as: 88 Utah 373,54 P.2d 842)

No-100 Dollars as an advance on my-our wool by S.
W. Bridges & Co., Inc., of Boston, Mass., the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, 1-We agree to ship
on consignment to the said S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc.,
my-our entire clip of 1929 wool, about 4,800 fleeces,
about 40,000 pounds. I-we agree to deliver my-our
wool to said S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc., (or their representative) F. O. B. cars at D. & R. G. W. Railroad
on or about May 29, 1929, in good, marketable condition, well tied and honestly packed. A further advance: up to a total of twenty cents per pound will be
made by S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc., or their representative. I-we agree thai if at any lime the collateral for
said advance, in the opinion ofS. W. Bridges & Co.,
Inc., is not sufficient to adequately protect said advance together with charges, /-ice will reduce said
advance by payment of such amount as is deemed
necessary by S. W. Bridges & Co.. Inc., or will deliver sufficient additional collateral satisfactory to S.
W. Bridges & Co., Inc.
See telegrams of this date.
I-we agree to pay interest on all advances, including
freight charges and cartage, at the rate of 6 percent
per annum, and a commission of two and one-half
cents per pound if wool is sold in original packages,
or three cents per pound if wool is graded, said commission to include guarantee of sales, also labor,
storage, and premium for fire insurance for 6 months
after arrival of wool in Boston. S. W. Bridges & Co,,
Inc., agree to keep the wool insured against fire in
companies of good reputation. It is mutually agreed
that the selling of the said wool is to be left to the
best judgment of S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc.
I-we agree to defend the title of said wool against all
claims whatsoever.
It is understood and agreed that this contract cannot
be altered in any respect, nor shall any lien or mortgage be placed on the wool during the life of this
contract except by written consent of S. W. Bridges
& Co., Inc.
This agreement is signed in duplicate, one copy to be
retained by each party.
[Signed] W. D. Candland & Sons."

54 P.2d 842
88 Utah 373, 54 l'.2d 842
(Cite as: 88 Utah 373,54 I'.2d 842)

)57k441(h k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In action on written contract providing that plaintiff
was to sell wool belonging to defendants, who were
to pay expenses incident to sale with interest on advances by plaintiff, and that contract could not be
altered without consent of plaintiff, parol evidence
held inadmissible to show agreement with plaintiffs
agent that plaintiff was to grade, scour, and sell wool
within 60 days after deliver}'.

4H)k253 Refreshing Memory
4IOk257 k. Admissibility or Writing as
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
P<muittiii|uu$e^f,djc i umcujs^^
oluded*fls*hearsay~beyond-pamUif tefreshjm^^polIpcllOilifiOUviuus&s $p„aj>tto •eji.iWij, w j t n e s ^ ^ ^ ^ y
viionumdependQiU memory, hdd ecroj, sil)CA.a£fresh>
ing-rffcfflleotion.jis'-.notBequtvaienUM^t^m^J'ront
.document*,
Witnesses 410 €=>257

Principal nnd Agent 308 ^

148(1)

308 Principal and Agent
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308111(C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts
308kl48 Knowledge or Notice of Extent of
Authority
308kl48(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Although principal is bound by acts or statements of
agent done or made within his authority or apparent
authority, act or statement of agent showing on its
face that it is adverse to principal presents notice to
third person that there is no authority therefor.

4j0 Witnesses
410111 Examination
4IOIIKA)Taking Testimony in General
410k253 Refreshing Memory
4IOk257 k. Admissibility of Writing as
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Witness may refresh memory from any memorandum
or document, whether made by witness, or by another
at his instance, or whether never seen before, where
instrument serves merely to start recollective processes in action; b u t . w n e i ^ d o c u m e a U s ^ i c J u ^ i ^
cause*Jiearsay,*con tents scannat,*be?inlroduea<Lunder

pwiexuikeii-cshiH&ii^aiJ^ea.
*842 White, Wright & Arnovitz and Chris Mathison,
all of Salt Lake City, and L. Leland Larson, of Manti,
for appellant.

Trial 388 €=>233(1)
388 Trial
388 Vll Instructions to Jury
388VI 1(C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency
388k231 Sufficiency as to Subject-Matter
388k233 Statement of Issues
3SSk233(li k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In action on contract whereunder plaintiff was to sell
wool belonging to defendants, who were to pay expenses of sale and interest on advances made by
plaintiff, instruction that issue was whether plaintiff
was to scour and sell wool within 60 days and reimburse itself for advances, expenses without refund
from defendants held error, in absence of evidence
substantiating allegation in answer that defendants
were not to reimburse plaintiff.

Rawlings & Wallace, of Salt Lake City, and L. R.
Christensen, of Mt. Pleasant, for respondents.
WOLFE, Justice.
This appeal involves, among other matters, the construction of a printed form contract and two addendum telegrams; also, the extent to which oral evidence should be admitted to explain an alleged ambiguity in those writings. Perhaps the best presentation
of the facts may be made by setting out in full the
printed form introduced as Exhibit E and hereafter so
referred to, and the two telegrams set out hereunder,
respectively, as Exhibits F and G and hereafter referred to by those designations, all being dated May
*843 24, 1929. The italics throughout are supplied:

%WJtnesses41«!C~5^2S¥»
"Mt. Pleasant, Utah, May 24, 1929
iMsM/jtuesses
i4lifliiUi-F-*atninatif"1
^^•(^^WAVJflkl^)lBlXgJ>ti^T^lfllllK•I^Qff^fiB,

For and in consideration of the payment of the sum of
Two Thousand Dollars and Twenty-Five Hundred &

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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On this contract is a notation, "See telegrams of this
date." The telegrams read as follows:
"S. W. Bridges and Co., Inc.
200 Summer Street, Boston, Mass.
Upon receipt by North Sanpete Bank here or telegram that yoii will not demand additional margin
from W. D. Candland and Sons nor John H. Seely &
Sons Co. against their wool consignments unless
their equity therein declines below twenty percent
Candland and Seely will deposit drafts for forty five
hundred and six thousand dollars respectively with
consignment contracts attached balance of twenty
cents per pound advance will be drawn against bills
lading covering forty thousand and sixty thousand lbs
respectively prompt shipment early sale requested no
restrictions very reasonably hope to net thirty two flat
job my address Saff Lake City.
[Signed] Alex R. Livingstone, Jr."
The above was Exhibit F. Exhibit G reads as follows:
"North Sanpete Bank,
Mt. Pleasant, Utah.
As arranged by Alexander Livingstone we will accept
consignments Candland and Seely advancing a total
of twenty cents per pound terms as per our printed
contract. We will not call for any additional margin
from Candland or Seely unless their equity in the
total amount expended shall fall below twenty percent of the fair value of the wool please wire if transaction is definitely closed.

54 P.2d 842
88 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842
(Cite as: 88 Utah 373,54 P.2d 842)

sions, and miscellaneous expenses amounted to
$12,333.10, leaving due the plaintiff $2,624.30,
which defendants refused to pay. While defendants in
their answer technically denied the correctness of
these amounts, the matter was not disputed by evidence. The plaintiff set out as a basis for its recovery
only the writing Exhibit E without the supplemental
telegrams. The defendants *844 denied that such was
the contract, but set up an amended counterclaim
alleging that the agreement was that plaintiff would
grade and scour the wool and sell the same at the fair
market value within 60 days after deliver}' of the
vvool to it.
The evidence for plaintiff was entirely by depositions
and documentary. W. D. Candland was the only witness who testified orally for the defendants. He testified that he did not want to sign Exhibit E with the
italicized portions in the contract, whereupon Livingstone sent Exhibit F and the Sanpete Bank received in
reply Exhibit G. Candland was permitted to give testimony of purported conversations between himself
and Livingstone before the contract was signed to the
effect that Livingstone had agreed that Bridges would
have the wool scoured and sold within 60 days. Nothing appeared in the writings concerning such agreement between the parties. The court admitted it under
the theory that it was of aid in clearing up an ambiguity. Contends Candland that if plaintiff had performed this alleged agreement to sell in 60 days from
delivery, enough would have been realized so that all
plaintiffs advances and expenses would have been
paid and Candland would have received $2,800. for
which amount defendants prayed judgment in their
counterclaim.

According to the testimony of Mr. Bridges, Alex R.
Livingstone, Jr., was a wool buyer for the plaintiff
and other firms.

Examination of the writings and of the evidence, we
think, abundantly reveals and sustains the proposition
that under no theory of the case was (he oral evidence
Of Candland admissible to show an agreement with
plaintiff to grade, scour, and sell within 60 days after
delivery. On this ground, as well as on additional
grounds later to be considered, the judgment must be
reversed.

The complaint alleged that $8,700 had been advanced
to defendants on the wool; that total credits allowable
to defendants by reason of the sale of the wool
amounted to $9,709.74; and that the total charges
against them for advances, interest on advances,
scouring charges, inspection and separation, commis-

An examination of Exhibits E, F, and G, above
quoted, leaves it doubtful whether there really is an
ambiguity. The testimony of Candland shows that
defendants refused to accept the italicized condition
in the proffered printed form. Then Livingstone sent
Exhibit F, which is really not a part of the contract

[Signed] S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc,"
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because it is informative to plaintiff that Candland
would accept a contract in which plaintiff would not
call for more collateral or "drawback" of any part of
the advances unless their equity declined below 20
per cent. Twenty per cent, of what? The commonsense version is 20 per cent, of the value of the wool
Candland was selling. Candland was the owner of the
wool, but the plaintiffs advances gave it a very substantial interest in that wool. It would be as anxious
as Candland to sell the wool for enough to meet all
advancements, commissions, and charges. Tersely, as
telegrams usually are written, it is plain that what was
meant was that as long as the value of the wool at any
time on the market kept at such a figure that 20 per
cent, or more of that value after all the advancements,
commissions, and charges owing to plaintiff were
deducted, belonged to the defendants, plaintiff would
demand no further collateral or drawback of the advancement. Thousands of telegrams a year are sent
where words ctsed are invested with meaning derived
from business and trade practices or understandings.
No intelligent business man would have mistaken the
meaning of Exhibit F. It is part of the contract, however, only as it serves to explain Exhibit G, which
was the reply telegram. In Exhibit G plaintiff made a
slip which it seems was its undoing. It states that the
plaintiff will not call for any additional security unless defendants' equity "in the total amount expended' shall fall below 20 per cent, of the fair value
of the wool. This, literally read, does not appear to
make sense. What plaintiff most probably meant was
that if the difference between the value of the wool
and the amount expended did not fall below 20 per
cent, of the former, it would not call for collateral.
Strictly speaking, there is an ambiguity. But this did
not furnish defendants with a license to introduce
evidence which never could explain such ambiguity.
The evidence in regard to an agreement to grade and
scour and sell within 60 days had no relation to the
ambiguity in this telegram. Defendants seek to find
an opening in the phrase, "as arranged by Alexander
Livingstone." This it is contended leaves it open as to
what was arranged by Livingstone, and thus the door
is open for the admission of all the alleged oral
agreements. Not so. It was clear that the wire of May
24th (Exhibit G), in answer to one sent the same day
by Livingstone (Exhibit F), did not refer to any arrangements which, if made at all, plaintiff at the time
it received the wire had never heard of. Candland
testified that Livingstone told him that he (Livingstone) had told plaintiff of the 60-dny agreement and
thus plaintiff could have referred to it. But the only
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notation on the contract is to these telegrams, and we
have no evidence of *845 what if an> thing mort
than was contained in the telegram of Livingstone
had been communicated to plaintiff It is quite evi
dent the parties desired to make the printed form as
modified by the telegrams the contract and not the
printed form as modified by the telegrams as added to
or modified or supplemented b> what either Candland or Livingstone might say they talked about
It was to guard against a situation of this sort that the
clause was placed in the contract that it could not be
altered except by the consent of the plaintiff This is a
typical case which shows the value of that precaution
Livingstone nowhere through deposition or other
wise, is a witness But the adverse party gives evi
deuce of what Livingstone said before the contract
was signed and what he said a year after (see
hereunder) under the theory evidently that everything
Livingstone is purported to have said is as if the principal, Bridges had said it Livingstone being the
agent of Bridges Everything which Candland said to
Livingstone and ever) thing Livingstone said to
Candland is conveyed through the mouth of Candland, an adverse witness This under proper condi
tions, is permissible but evidentl) plaintiff by its
contract sought to foreclose an) matters not covered
by the writings and sought to avoid being at the
mercy of the party on the other end of the contract
The writings cannot be added to or changed by oral
evidence They contain the full contract When am
biguous the ambiguity may be cleared up by oral
evidence If so ambiguous that no sense can be de
rived from them, in certain cases the writings are
discarded and the agreement arrived at before it was
reduced to writing ma) be testified to provided always that the fundamental condition is present that
there was a meeting of the minds If tins principle
were not adhered to, writings would be of very little
value And they would not be of much greater value
if the courts permitted the doing away with a definite
recordation of the matters on which the minds had
met by allowing, under some guise, all other matters
discussed or talked about in a preliminary way to
come in when that was just what the writing was de
signed to prevent It appears that an early sale was
requested because Livingstones wire says so But it
merely states that it was requested not demanded
Apparently that had been mentioned But if, instead
of casually being mentioned Candland had considered it important that Bridges sell within 60 days and
wanted it as part of the agreement, he would have
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insisted that the printed form be modified in that regard as well as in regard to the matter ol additional
collateral The printed part of the contract specifies,
' that the selling of said wool is to be left to the best
judgment of Bridges &, Co' While these observations go more to the improbability of an) time limit
foi the sale having actually been agreed upon than to
the question of the admissibility of the evidence they
arc quite material in considering whether the words
as arranged b) Ale\ Livingstone,' ever could be
used as a vehicle to transport into the case this pur
ported oral agreement as to a time limit for selling the
wool We think those words cannot be made to apply
to some alleged oral arrangement b) Livingstone, but
must be taken to refer to the arrangement suggested
by Livingstone in his wire to Bridges Certainly, it
would not be bevond the confines of reasonable con
struction to hold that the words, "as arranged by Livingstone ' were confirmator) of the suggested modi
fication contained in Livingstones wire of the same
date in which case all else in Bridges' wire would
have been superfluous The 20 cents per pound advancement was e\actl> what Livingstone had put in
his wire and the part about additional margins in the
Bridges wire, we have little doubt was also meant to
conform to the matter in Livingstones wire This is
borne out by the fact that Livingstone in his wire
says * Upon receipt of North Sanpete Bank here of a
telegram " etc Then follow the conditions Bridges
wired the bank He would hardly have wired the bank
if he meant to refer to some arrangements between
Candland and Livingstone never suggested in Livingstone's wire and in regard to which it is quite un
likel) that he would have thought the bank would
know about The bank was to be apprised of the acquiescence of Bridges to the suggested modification
of the part of the printed contract relating to collateral
and adverted to in the telegram from Livingstone to
Bridges The bank would then accept the draft and
present to the payor the plaintiffs bank
Defendants however contend there is evidence of
Livingstone's statements purported to have been
made to Candland in the office of his attorneys on
May 8 1930 about a year after the consignment con
tract*846 was signed Candland on his direct exami
nation testified, over objection that (I) "Mr Livingstone advised me not to pa> Bridges one cent that it
was an outrage for him to ask it that he had made a
contract with me for Bridges, and Bridges had failed
to keep it although he had urged him many times to
do what he promised (2) Mr Livingstone told me
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nther tlnn the contents of his memory set off by the
instrument its use should be prevented past the point
where it serves the latter office But on a broader
ground objection was well taken Any statements of
Livingstone of the nature offered made on May 8
1930, were hearsay The theory under which they
were offered was that they were Bridges' statements
because made by Bridges agent in the course of
Bridges business Assuming that Livingstone was
representing Bridges to adjust the matter, certainly
Livingstone was not authorized to misrepresent
Bridges If Candland's testimony is correct, a man
who purported to be Bridges' agent said what has
been above numbered (1) (2) and (3) and in addi
tion the following (4)' He was ashamed that he had
not been allowed to carry out the contract he made
with me and that if Mr Bridges had carried out the
contract there would have been no loss m the sale of
that wool (5) that he repeatedly asked Mr Bridges to
have it scoured ind put on the market, and he offered
to do the work himself that that might be done, and
(6) if it had been sold anywhere in that period there
would have been a substantial sum returned to me,
(7) that he got that wool on the express agreement
that he would scour and sell w ithm 60 days "
Statements by Livingstone designated as (I) are Livingstones advice to Candland Livingstone's imprecation against his supposed principal Bridges Livingstone's conclusion as to Bridges failing to keep a contract Livingstone's purported statement designated
(2) is Livingstones idea that Bridges had not kept his
contract and his opinion of what would have happened had Bridges done so Advice of an agent or his
criticism of his principal are not facts Admissions
must generally be as to facts An opinion may involve the consciousness of Inbility or fault but when
made by an agent such opinion must be within the
scope or his authority
Statement (4) embraces the idea that (he contract had
not been cirned out a conclusion on the ultimate
question to be decided by the court on the defense
side Statement (5) miy Inve been made by Living
stone to Bridges but if Bridges had no duty to scour
the wool Livingstone's request to handle the wool in
that fashion would not mike such a duty This does
not involve an admission that Bridges Ind the obliga
tion to do so but only that Livingstone's idea com
municated to Bridges, was that it should be scoured
Statement (6) is simply the expression of an opinion

that if Bridges had kept his agreement there would
have been no loss but there would have been a sub
stantial amount come to me from the sale of that
wool (3) He had notified Mr Bridges of the agree
ment (hat I had made with him and that Bridges had
accepted the consignment with that understanding "
Later on redirect examination, an affidavit purported
to have been made by Livingstone on May 8, 1930
the same day as the above statements were testified to
have been made which affidavit was formerly refused admission was given to Candland who was
apparentl) permitted to sit before the |ury and refresh his recollection b> reading largely from the
document, against the objection of plaintiff We shall
first consider this method of testifying and then take
up the broader ground of objection made to the witness' testimony above set out given on direct and the
additional testimon) concerning Livingstone's state
ments to him on May 8, 1930 given on redirect by
aid of the affidavit The admission of all this testimony is assailed by assignments Nos 1 and 8
Refreshing a recollection is not equivalent to reading
from a document "Recollection" is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary as the act or practice of collecting the mind, concentration, act of rec
ollecting or recalling to the memory, the power of
recalling ideas to the mind that which is recollected,
something called to the mind The process indulged
in by Candland was not one of having his memory
touched off by something contained in the affidavit
and thus supplying independent!) of the document
after such recalling but was a process of indirectly
getting in evidence the contents of the affidavit it
being perfectly apparent to the jury This was more
prejudicial than introducing the affidavit because the
jury might not be given the benefit of any qualifications or contradictions which might appear in the
affidavit Not Candland but the affidavit was testify
ing Documents used in connection with recollection
are of two sorts (1) Those which serve to set the
processes of recollection agog The fact or circumstances are then loosed from the storage of the mind
independently of the document as a present recollection It serves to titillate only (2) Those which serve
to give present evidence of a recorded past recollection or fact Certain qualifications are required of this
second class which need not now be discussed As to
the first class any memorandum or document
whether made by the witness, or by another at his

While a principal is bound by the acts or statements
of his agent done or made within his authority and
even within his apparent authority where the principal has put him in a position or given him such
authority as permits an authority not given to appear
as if given yet where the act or statement itself
shows on its face (hat it is adverse to the principal it
presents it once notice to the other tint theie is no
such authority An authority to say something can
hardl\ be apparent or actual when the statement itself
is not for the principal but deliberately and designedly against him The principal in selecting an agent

Wigmore says in his Second Edition on Evidence,
vol 2 § 758, p 37
"The purpose being to allow the legitimate use of
written aids while preventing their misuse it would
seem that no hard-and fast rules can be laid down for
invariable application That which is suspicious and
reprehensible in one instance may be entirely trustworthy in the *847 next No unerring marks of impropriety can be named absolutely
It follows, therefore, that am writing whatevei l%
eligible foi use while, on the other hand, am »nlmg
»hale\ei may in the cucuinitances become im
pi oper "
The discretion of the court must control the use but
where a document is excluded from admission because hearsay, the contents thereof cannot be got in
evidence under the pretext of refreshing a recollection Where it is apparent that the witness is just
transmitting to the jury the contents of the instrument
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and does not even, like statement (2), involve the
admission of not keeping a contract which is embedded in statement (2) Statement (7) purports to be
Li\ mgstone's conclusion of what the express contract
between Candland and Bridges was Statement (3) is
as to the fact that Bridges had been notified of this
purported agreement to sell within 60 days In the
analysis of these statements we have two things to
consider The first do any of them involve matter
which can be classified as admissions9 Secondly, if
admissions were they w ithin the scope of the purported agents authority or scope of agency9 We can
test the first by considering what would be the effect
if made by Bridges himself If Bridges had said that
Candland did not owe him a cent that it was an outrage that he should ask it and that he (Bridges) had
failed to keep his contract with Candland and that if
he (Bridges) had kept his contract there would have
been no loss and that he got the wool on the express
agreement that he would scour and sell it within 60
days the element of contradiction to his position in
court necessary to an admission would be present,
granting the opinions or conclusions on ultimate
questions made bv a pirty to a suit out of court may
be given in court a point at this time not necessary to
decide Any one who had heard Bridges so state
could testify to such matters and if the jury believed
such witness Bridges would have been out of court
But were they within the scope of the agents authority9 Assuming that Lningstone on May 8 1930, was
an agent of Bridges to seek an adjustment of the matter and there is some evidence of this in Bridges'
deposition that he asked Livingstonc*848 about a
year later "to see Candland about it -were these
statements purporting to have been made by Livingstone within (he scope of his authority9 It is hardly to
be presumed that an agent sent out to adjust a claim
has authority to state that his principal is a scoundrel
and that there is nothing owing to him

instance, or whether never seen before will suffice
but care must be exercised by the court to see that
such instrument is serving the function merely of
starting (he recollective processes in action It was
said by Sir G A Lewin in a note to Lawes v Reed
2 Lew Cr C 152 that ' Where the ob|ect is to revive
in the mind of the witness the recollection of the facts
of which he once had knowledge it is difficult to
understand why am means should be excepted to
whereby that object may be obtained Whether in an)
particular case the witness memor) has been re
freshed by the document referred to or he speaks
from what the document tells him, is a question of
fact open to observation more or less according to
the circumstances If in truth the memory has been
refreshed, and he is enabled in consequence to speak
to facts with which he was once familiar but which
afterwards escaped him, it cannot signify, in effect in
what manner or by what means these facts were re
called to his recollection Common experience tells
every man that a very slight circumstance, and one
not in point to the existing inquiry will sometimes
revive the history of a transaction made up of many
circumstances *** Why then if a man may refiesh
his memory by such means out of court should he be
precluded from doing so when he is under examination in court"? 2 Wigmore on Evid (2d Ed ) 17, note
to § 758

is not bound b) such treachery as that For these reasons Livingstone could not be said (o have apparent
authority in a mission peaceably to adjust a diffi
culty to make the statements which on their face
showed just the opposite from an authority apparent
The statements therefore, were in no sense admissions of Bridges because made by Livingstone as his
agent within the scope of his authority or apparent
authority Says Wigmore, vol 2, on Evidence (2d
Cd)§l078 p 585
"He who sets another person to do an act in his stead
as agent is chargeable by such acts as are done under
that authority, and so too properl) enough is af
fected by admissions made by the agent in the course
of exercising (hat authority The question therefore
turns upon the scope of the authority This question
frequently enough a difficult one, depends upon the
doctrine of Agency applied to the circumstances of
Die case, and not upon any rule of Evidence
The common phrasing of the principle i! well repre
sented in the following passage
1839, Buchanan C J , in Franklin Bank v Pcnnsxl
\ania D &. M S N Co . 11 Gill & I 28. 33 33
Am Dec 687 "The principle upon which the declaration or representations of an agent within the scope
of his authority are permitted to be proved, is (hat
such declarations as well as his acts are considered
and treated as the declarations of his principal What
is so done by an agent is done by the principal
through him as his mere instrument So whatever is
said by an agent either in the making a contract for
his principal or at the time, and accompanying the
performance of any act within the scope of his
authority ha\ ing relation to, and connected with and
in the course of the particular contract or trinsaction
in which he is then engaged, is in legal effect, said
by his principal, and idmisstble in evidence not
niereh because it is (he declaration or admission of
an agent but on the ground that being made at the
time of and accompanying the contract or transaction
it is treated as the declaration or admission of the
principal, constituting a part of the ' res gestae a
part of the contract or transaction and as binding
upon him as if in fact made by himself But declarations or admissions by an agent of his own authority
and not accompanying the making of a contract, or
the doing of an act in behalf of his principal nor
made at the time he is engaged in the transaction to

Pages

which they refer, are not binding upon his principal
not being part of the "res gestae", and are not admissible in evidence, but come within the general rule of
law, excluding hearsay evidence being but an ac
count or statement by an agent of what has passed or
been done or omitted to be done not a part of the
transaction but only statements or admissions re
spectmg it'
The language from the quotation from the Franklin
Bank Case, which seems to fit the facts of this case
is that the so-called admissions of Livingstone appear
to be the "account or statement by an agent of what
has passed or been done or omitted to be done,' and
as agent Livingstone had no such authority to comment or give his idea of what Bridges had formerly
agreed to do The eighth assignment of error was well
taken The purported statements of Livingstone alleged to have been made on Mav 8 1930 were
highly prejudicial before a jury and alone would have
to result in a reversal of this case
The court gave an instruction which advised the jury
that the issue was whether on the one hand the contract was as alleged by the plaintiff, or on the other
hand to scour and sell the wool within 60 days and
that plaintiff was to reimburse itself for its advances,
expenses, charges and commissions and not call on
defendants for any refund We know of no evidence
substantiating the allegation in the amended answer
that the defendants *849 were in no event to renn
burse plaintiff The testimony was that if the wool
had been sold in 60 days the plaintiff could have re
imbursed itself for all these charges and there would
have remained a surplus for defendants But neither
the written instruments nor any testimony of purported conversations between Livingstone and Candland reveal any such agreement The testimony of
Candland that he 'had a conversation with Livingstone to the effect that the expenses of handling that
wool was to come out of the difference between what
I recieved and what it was sold for is not proper evidence to sustain such position In the first place it
was not admissible under the principles heretofore
announced to explain the purported ambiguity in the
writings Secondly, it gives no conversation but con
elusions They may have been Livingstone's opinion
as to what could be accomplished by a quick sale and
not a commitment, Assignment No 6 which attacks
the admission of this evidence is well taken There
was testimony that had it been sold such would have
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;en the effect. The instruction was therefore erroneJS. Assignment No. 14 is therefore well taken. Also
isignments Nos. 15 and 16 directed to the same inrtiction. Assignments Nos I to 7, both inclusive,
tack rulinys which we have already discussed.
he judgment of the lower court is set aside, and a
ew trial granted; appellant to recover costs
LIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, EPHKAIM
[ANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur.
Jtah 1936.
>.W. Bridges & Co. v. Candland
8 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842
<ND OF DOCUMENT
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in evidence or available for examination by the opposite party.[38] A witness is allowed to read a transcript of prior
testimony,[J9] a statement the witness made and signed,[40] or an affidavit,];!!] deposition,[42] or wriiien statement.[43J
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated June 2009
Witnesses
John R. Kennel, J.D., John Kimpflen, J.D , Anne Knickerbocker, J.D., Stephen J. Lease, J.D., Charles Nagy, J.D.,
Mitch Waldman, J.D., Rosemary Williams, J.D.
IV. Examination

The use of a writing is permissible to refresh the memory of a witness as to dates;[44] the witness's physical
condition at a certain time;fjj_5] the place where the witness was on a certain day;[46] names[47] and addresses;[48]
physical measurements;[49] and the contents of a lost contract.[50]
A witness may not testify to facts of which the witness is without present or past recollection and which are
biought to mind for the first time by the memoranda of another person [51] Thus, a person may not read or testify
from a transcript of a reporter's notes taken at a former trial where the transcript is not vouched lor by the reporter.[52] A witness's testimony of facts to which the witness never had personal knowledge cannot be rendered
competent by a claim of refreshed recollection.[5Y| Similarly, a witness may not evade a public policy that certain
reports are privileged and are not admissible in evidence by using such a report to refresh recollection.[54] An entry
in a record which the witness did not make and of whose correctness the witness did not have peisonal knowledge at
the time it was made may not be used.[55]

A Taking Testimony
6. Refreshing Memory or Testimony of Past Recollection
b. Writings

Laying a foundation for the use of a writing.
A writing cannot be used to refresh the memory of a witness without a proper foundation being laid [!fi] A witness should not be allowed to see, consult, or refer to a writing for the purpose of refreshing memory unless and
until it appears that the aid of this writing is necessary [57] It is proper to refuse to permit the use of writings for this
purpose where the witness has a clear, distinct, and independent recollection of the facts.[5_8]

Topic Summars References
§ 438. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Witnesses €=>254.255, 2*5(1) to (4), (6) to (10), 259
The use of a writing by a witness during an examination for the purpose of refreshing recollection rests largely
in the discretion of the trial court.
The use of a writing by a witness during an examination to revive or refresh recollection rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.[i] Rtdes^law^m^h^rf?!vevralved t with^
A witness may be compelled to inspect a writing which is present in court where there is reason to believe that.Jjx
rttiding-u^tnemory-niay-berfefrBshed.tl] Hftweverl>tl»e^K>ur4-.iniist^alerinine-^hetiieiahe-J^ime«.isaesti£yJiig4'rom
thewrttiiigjQr^rom.recoHeotion;R-^
tli&Aviluessihe-lcstimony-that-iB^xpectcd.fi] Mucli depends on the nature of the writing,[6] the circumstances under
which it was made,[7] and the matter it contains.[8] It may be an error, in a case involving a large number of items
which a witness is unable to carry in mind or testify to in detail from memory alone, to refuse to permit the witness
to refer to a writing.[9]
Any writing which in fact stimulates, revives or refreshes the present memory or recollection of a witness may
be nscd,[10J including notes;[JJJ niemoranda;[JL2] rccords;[JL3] certificates;[i4] books;[ii] notebooks;[I6] ledgers;[i7] letters;[I8] written bids,[i°J drawings or sketches;[20] maps;[2JJ tax returns;[22] check books;[21] inventories or lists;[24] phone logs;[25] police reports[26] or records;[2_7J accident,[2R] investigative[29] or social welfare
agency[30] reports; executed legal proccss;[3JJ and a table of life expectancies.[32] The rule also applies to tape
recordings,[3JJ songs or sound recordings,[34J photographs;[35] and/or scents or alhisions.[3jV) All of the writings
and documents involved in a business transaction may be used.[T7] Similarly, a summary of a voluminous mass of
entries contained in numerous books and records may be referred to, provided the original books and documents are
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Testimony from revived recollection
A witness may testify as to matters about which memory has been refreshed[5_9] if the testimony is from a present and independent recollection[60] and not from the recollection as recorded,[61] It is no objection that the writing used is not introduced in evidence,[62] for the refreshment rule does not permit the introduction of the stimulus
into evidence.[63] The evidence is the testimony of the witness and not the writing used to stimulate this memory.[<H] The witness must testify to the facts as remembered[65] from the refreshed rccollection,[66] without the aid
of the writing,[67] and may not read[68] or show[69] the writing to the jury or state what the writing says or
shows [70] The reliability of the writing need not be established,[7T] nor need the writing be identified,[72J although
the nature of the writing used is significant in evaluating the probative force of the witness's testimony,[73]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Neither attorney-client privilege nor work product doctrine barred discovery of documents which deponent used
to refresh his memory prior to, but not during, the deposition: plaintiff consented to defendants' review of those
documents at the deposition, answered a number of questions directed at many of those documents without objection, and the documents would not tread on plaintiffs attorney's thought processes since it was not attorney's summaries which were at issue, but rather, the notations of the deponent himself. Heron Interact. Inc v Guidelines Inc,.
244 F.R.D 75. 74 Fed R. Fvid Serv 274 (P. Mnss. 2007).
Victim was entitled to use police report, which contained the contents of text messages defendant sent to victim,
to refresh her memory regarding the messages, where victim accurately recalled the gist or the general nature of
each text message prior to viewing the police report. State v. Espiritu. 117 Haw 127. 176 P.3d 8S> (2008).
If a witness uses a document to refresh his or her recollection on the stand, the spirit and text of the rule governing a writing or object used to refresh memory require that, absent circumstances addressed by the provision on
terms and conditions of the production of the document, the parties whose interests could be harmed by the testimony that was based on the refreshed memory must have access to the document Gault \ State. 878 N.E 2d 1260
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

1

MR. PERKINS:

Thank you.

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

THE WITNESS:

I received a -- a phone call about

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

3

illegal parking and other activity in this specific area in the

)

4

city.

)

5

) CASE NO. 081401889

6

into that in further detail.

7

51 South 1600 West, is that within Utah County?

VS.
TIMOTHY A. LAMOREAUX

(F^/ft

)

PV
f

Defendant.

u

)

If

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS

8

A

Yes, sir.

9

Q

Thank you.

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

12

125 NORTH 100 WEST

13

what you did?
A

I -- I responded to that particular scene, did not

locate the vehicle in question.

However, I did walk across the

street at that point to a residence that was initially given to
me by the individual, stating that maybe the vehicle had been

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

16

parked here in this complex and belonged to the people across

JURY TRIAL

17

the street.

18

find that vehicle in question.

19

Kaylene C. T. Scotson, RPR, CRR, CCP, FCRR

Q

When I walked across the street, I attempted to

What did you observe as you went to that -- well,

20

when you say you walked across the street, is that to a

21

different address, or is this relatively close to the place you

22

responded?

23

A

It's pretty close.

to the south of the original address.

25

parking lot, just right off of West Center Street, about 1500

And so you walked across.

It's in a old pharmacy

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

And I parked in the old pharmacy parking lot.
Okay.

It's right across the street just

24

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

What did you

A

He was on the driver's side of that vehicle.

Q

And did you identify him?

observe when you walked across to this old pharmacy parking

A

Eventually he was identified.

lot?

Q

How was that?

A

Some of the people that -- that actually responded

A

There's actually a -- a residence, a specific

residence.

It's 1585 West Center Street.

apartment complex.

There is a separate

9 !

Q

Okay.

A

Tim Lamoreaux.

And what name did he give?

And just to make the record clear, you see him here

10

the duplex, and at that point I observed a gray vehicle.

10

Q

11

was one male on the driver's side, one male on the passenger's

11

today?

12

side.

12

A

I do see him here today.

13

Q

Will you please describe him.

A

He's the defendant right there in the white shirt and

13
14

Q

Did you see anybody inside the car?

A

There were actually three occupants of the vehicle,

15

including -- there would be technically three and a half.

16

small child was in the vehicle as well.

17
18
19

There

He

identified himself, basically eventually told me who he was.

I parked in that parking lot,

got out of my vehicle and walked east, rounding the corner of

How did you do that?

that night knew him, and he was also identified by name.

It's almost like a duplex that's just east

of the old pharmacy parking lot.
9

Let me, before we go

That address that you've given,

14

84601

JANUARY 05, 2009

Q

Thank you.

15

PROVO, UTAH

West.

Q.

Will you describe how you responded to the scene and

10
11

Reported by:

MR. PERKINS:

One

Q

Were you able to identify those people?

A

I -- I eventually was able to identify all the people

in the vehicle --

14
15

dark tie

16

MR. PERKINS:

17

May the record reflect that the witness has

18

Thank you.

identifi d the defendant?

19

THE COURT:

It may, counsel.

20

Q

Okay.

20

MR. PERKINS:

Thank you.

21

A

-- and outside of the vehicle.

21

MR. PERKINS:

Q.

22

Q

Okay.

23

Thank you.

A

Who were the occupants of the car?

The driver was Suzanne Ruesch.

The passenger was

Did you see the defendant there that night?

Amber Coutts.

A

I did see the defendant there.

who was identified later, but I don't believe her information

Q

Where was he?

is included in this report.

And there was a female that was in the back seat

Q

Okay.

Now, you said Suzanne Ruesch was in the

actually had identification on him at that point.

driver's seat; is that correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And you made mention earlier of three and a half

people being in the car/ a small child.

2

Q

He just identified himself?

3

A

He did.

Q

Okay.

4

Where was that child?

5

When you came up to the car as you rounded the

corner, what did you see?

A

He was in the back seat with his mom.

6

Q

Okay.

And is that the -- that's the person who

7

Mrs. Ruesch, something.

you've just mentioned you don't have the name for in your

8

that point.

report?

A

I noticed the defendant handing the driver,
I wasn't sure exactly what it was at

9

Q

Okay.

A

Yes, sir.

10

A

It is at night.

11

Q

How old was that child, based on your -- I mean,

11

Q

Do you remember about what time?

12

apparently?

12

13

A

13

14

years old.

15

want to say.

16

Q

10

If I remember correctly, he was between one to two

Okay.

17
18

A

19
20

Q
car?

Probably about one and a half.

All right.

He was toddler I

Thank you.

I can refer to my report and tell you exactly what
It occurred about 9:52 p.m.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

It was very dark.

16

Q

How was the area lit?

A

There was a street light, but I did have my

Did you identify who -- ownership of the car?

17

It was Suzanne Ruesch's vehicle.

18

How did you identify each of the occupants of the

So is it fair to say it's pretty dark?

flashlight with me as well.

19

Q

And did you use that flashlight?

Did they have identification on them?

20

A

I did use that flashlight.

Q

When you saw Mr. Lamoreaux hand something to Suzanne

21

A

They did have identification.

21

22

Q

Okay.

22

A

I believe that Suzanne had identification for sure.

23

A
time.

This is at night, right?

Each one of them did?

Ruesch, did you have your flashlight on then?
A

I did.

24

I can't remember Amber, if she had identification or if she

Q

Okay.

25

just told us who she was.

A

At that point, being very concerned, I had the two

23

And I don't think Mr. Lamoreaux

What did you do next?

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

1

gentlemen step around to the rear of the vehicle where I could

I

2

kind of keep an eye on 'em just to -- for -- for my safety.

1

My follow up question is going to be about --

MR. PERKINS:

Your Honor, the State would respond.

3

Q

Uh-huh.

4

A

And that's kind of what we did at that point.

I

for the objection.

5

Q

Okay.

1

this question first of all.

6

A

I did eventually arrest Mr. Lamoreaux.

7

Q

Okay.

8

THE COURT:

At any point did you arrest Mr. Lamoreaux?

1

After you had arrested Mr. Lamoreaux, what did

you do?

9

A

Well, then let's wait for that and wait
So I'll wait for the - - h e can respond to

MR. PERKINS:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

Can you repeat the question one more

MR. PERKINS:

Q.

time?
At that point I continued to interview the

Did you interview, or did

10

individuals who were still at the scene, attempting to get more j

Ms. Ruesch say anything to you that caused you to suspect the

11

and addit ional information, which was done.

commission of any crime?

12

transported to the Utah County Jail along with the others

A

Yes.

13

involved.

Q

What was that?

14

Q

Okay.

Eventually he was J

Before we go into that, let me ask you about

15

the peopl e that you interviewed while you were still at that

16

location.

17

Did you talk to Suzanne Ruesch?
A

I did.

19

Q

Okay.

THE COURT:
no.

Objection, Your Honor.
Okay.
At this point, Your Honor, the State

would contend that we're not submitting this for the truth of
the matter, but only to establish the reason for Officer

Did she say anything that gave you cause to

MR. KING:

22
23

1

suspect a crime?

21

THE COURT:

MR. PERKINS:

18

20

MR. KING:
1

THE COURT:
Objection, Your Honor.
It's not hearsay.

Hearsay.

He can just say yes or

He's not going to testify as to what she said.

24

MR. KING:

25

THE COURT:

Sorensen's search of the car.

So long as the witness understands that.
Okay.

Very well.

MR. KING:
THE COURT:

Okay.

The defense can respond.

Your Honor, may we approach?
Surely.

(Side-bar held at the Bench off the record.)
THE COURT:

I need to make a record, counsel.

I will reject the objection, deny the objection, and

4i

find that it's not being presented for the purposes of the
establishment of truth

paraphernalia, like baggies and things like that

It's not relied upon as it relates to

the truth of the assertion involved

And he may respond

Q

The methamphetamme that you found

to the question

was a large amount

Why don't you repeat that question
MR

PERKINS

I will

MR

PERKINS

Q

counsel

A

with some clarification

Officer Sorensen, m

9

conversation that you had with Ms

Q

12

Ruesch, I'm just asking you

So the question is what did Ms
m

Ruesch state to you

your interview with her that caused you to suspect a crime'
A

13

She admitted that there was methamphetamine in her

14

vehicle, and that it was placed there initially, she stated

r—s

the defendant

16

Q

17

It was eventually weighed and determined to be about

In your training and experience, what does that

amount indicate to you'

about what did you cause to search her car

in

A
10

definitely not for personal use

11

distributing - - a n amount that would be distributed, not just

12

kept for personal use

13
by

That is a very large amount of methamphetamme,

Q

Okay

15

baggies or was it loose mside that cigarette container?

When you found the meth, was it in any

A

It was in the baggies inside the cigarette container

17

Q

And did you find it all in one bag

18

19

Q

And what did you find m

20

A

There was a black bag which was located behind the

her car'

A

It was packaged all m

Q

And you mentioned other plastic baggies in that black

passenger's seat of her vehicle on the floorboard

black bag it contained a lot of small baggies which are used to

22

23

contain or -- methamphetamme generally

23

24

amount of methamphetamme which was in a cigarette container,

24

25

which was also m

25

There was a large

that black bag, and other items of

packaged'

20

22

In that

21

A

Yes, sir

Q

In your training and experience, what are those

generally used for'
A

To contain methamphetamme in order to distribute it
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

If you'll just describe, you

know, your experience with dealing with drug crimes
find a large quantity of methamphetammes m

When you

several small

baggies, how do you put two and two together'

If you would put

two and two together for us'
Usually the -- the -- the amount of methamphetamine

7

that was found m

the vehicle was pre-packaged

8

you'll find it m

a -- m

9

sure that it was packaged for distribution what's in the
smaller baggies

a bigger baggy

one bag

leather pouch as well'

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

And how does that work'

Sometimes

Usually you know for

A lot of times what will happen is when

A

White crystalli substance, small chunks

this was actually some pretty good stuff
than is normal

depends on how it's manufactured

When you say pretty good stuff, what do you mean'

A

It was -- you know, there wasn't a lot that was put

in it that was used to -- to cut it

It definitely looked more

pure than is -- than what I've seen
Q

Okay

And, again, for those of us with less

experience with meth, what do you mean by cut it'

somebody distributee this -- this amount of drugs, they'll

other substances in it, m

13

bags, they'll measure it, they'll weigh it, make sure they've

manufacture it

14

got the right amounts, and then they'll determine an amount of

as the color, consistency, all that stuff

money as far as the cost based on the weight and the -- the
amount that are found in these baggies

17

of baggies

18

Q

20

And there were a lot

You said it was meth

It looks like meth

consistency as meth

What indicated to you, what

And it was eventually field tested and

Aacn-vi

Now
Ho

t-V>»

when you say it looked like meth
c;ii'hcjt-anr,e>"?

as far

indicates that it was more pure'
I -- I think so
PERKINS

Okay

At this point, Your Honor, I'd like to move to
excuse me, I'd like to present Exhibits 1 and 2

to Officer Sorensen
THE COURT
MR

will you

order to actually make it or

And it just all depends on the process

So are you saying the fact that it was more white

present - - o r

It has the same color

tested positive for methamphetamme
Q

Q

They put a bunch of different agents, chemicals,

MR

made you think it was methamphetamme'
A

A

A
Thank you

That all

Q

actually take what they've got originally, put it in the small

15

It was more white

This was pretty good stuff

12

16

It was --

Usually it's kind of a yellow color

11

Okay

or how was it

19

21

19

a

cigarette container

Did you perform a search of her car after that"7
I did

10

Now, you mentioned plastic baggies m

14

16

A

A

That would be a

Thank you

18

Q

you said there

Did you determine how much that was'

17 grams of methamphetamme

response to

this question, I'm not asking for each detail and the

10

I've got several follow up questions

then,

PERKINS

THE COURT
court, please

Have they previously been marked'
They have not
Have them marked by the clerk of the

MR

1
2

PERKINS

Two actually contains Beveral items

MR

Actually, I think we better just leave that one in the bag

3

THE CLERK

All right

3

4

THE COURT

Show them to counsel, please

4

5

you may approach

6

MR

PERKINS

7

MR

PERKINS

8

A

Yes, sir

6

A

There's actually three baggies

Q

Okay

8

A

Yes, it does

which contains the 17 grams of

I'd like to invite you to open the package and

pull out a sample of that
THE COURT

15

THE WITNESS

16

THE COURT
MR

17

the vehicle belonging to Suzanne Ruesch

7

Officer Sorensen, will you describe

This is the actual -- the packaging that

14

located m

Q

methamphetamine

13

These are the baggies of methamphetamine that were

Thank you

11

Okay

A

And how many baggies are you holding in your hand"?

10

Q

Dc you need the benefit of some scissors'?

9
10

MR

And each one of them contains methamphetamine'?

PERKINS

11

THE COURT

12

MR

13

THE COURT

14

Exhibit No

KING

Here you go

16

MR

17

publish it to the jury

And if it please the Court, may I have

PERKINS

18

THE COURT

the jury to show the methamphetamine without having to --

19

MR

20

THE COURT

certainly, but you will probably approach --

22

MR

23

THE COURT

24

Well, you can publish to the jury

PERKINS

Okay

PERKINS

Okay

Q

Okay

MR

A

25

If you'll move now to the package I've handed

PERKINS

No, sir

MR

Yes, sir

In one of the bags are the small baggies

12

Also, in one of the bags is

6
7

in

There's also digital scales and the black bag which

8

contained all of the items which are contained not only here

9

but also are just next to the jury box

11

the black leather pouch that you testified to finding earlier"?

12

A

Okay

Yes, sir

THE COURT

16

17

MR

THE COURT

State's Exhibit No

(State's Exhibit No

20
21

No, Your Honor

MR

PERKINS

17
2 may be received

2 was received into evidence )

And, again, the State requests

permission to publish it to the jury

22

THE COURT

23

MR

24

THE COURT
vm:

You may

PERKINS

Thank you
Ladies and gentlemen, as this is shown to

qimnlv don't onen

he baa at all as vou nass that around

How did you

A

I -- I actually thought that the defendant initially

was the one that was actually doing the distribution
Q

Okay

A

What I initially observed as I walked up to the

And what was that based on"?

vehicle

The -- that he was there next to the vehicle, that he

16

KING

When you say "they, " who do you mean"?

That being"?

15

Any objection, counsel?

Q

A

The State moves to admit Exhibit 2

Thank you

That they were distributing methamphetamine

Q

15

PERKINS

A

14

MR

19

Now, taking all of what you have

13

14

18

Q

think this was working"?

10

And what you've described are the contents of

13

PERKINS

was happening"?

order to contain the

the cigarette package that the methamphetamine was contained

Q

Was any of that meth found in any

testified to which you saw into account, what did you suspect

methamphetamine for distribution

11

Q

Thank you

Will you describe the contents of jphat

which are usually there to -- m

10

Stevens, when they finally

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

package"?
A

Thank you
And then, Mr

other locations besides that cigarette box"?

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

you marked Exhibit 2

You may

PERKINS

jury box

24
MR

1 was received into evidence )

And the State requests permission to

reach you, if you will just place those there on the end of the

-- the jury, as opposed to the witnfess,

please

25

State's

1

(State's Exhibit No

19

21

It may be received

15

the permission to have the -- excuse me -- the witness approach

THE COURT

Any objection, counsel''
No, Your Honor

18

20

Your Honor, the State moves to admit

Exhibit 1

Yes, I do

PERKINS

Officer Sorensen, now that you've

Q

was sent to the State lab,

12

Q

5

the package that I've handed to you marked State's Exhibit 1'

9

PERKINS

opened that package, will you describe the contents'?

had handed something to the driver
Q
Ms

Okay

18

A

I did

19

Q

Okay

20

After you found all of this stuff

m

Ruesch's car, did you talk to her again"?

We're going to hear from her later, so I won't

have you discuss at this point what she said to you

21

Did you interview Mr

Lamoreaux at any point"?

22

A

I did

23

Q

And when was that"?

A

I actually talked to him several times throughout the
ah t-hp qcpnp

ai well as at the

nail

1
2
3

Q

Okay

A

Let's talk about your discussion with him at

What did you ask him'

the scene

After he was mirandized, I -- I basically asked him

County Jail'

j
j

A

They were all taken to the Utah County Jail

j

Q

And did you speak with them again at the jail'

4

what was going on, if he could kind of fill me in on the

1

A

I did

5

situation and circumstances

1

Q

Okay

6
7
8
9
10
11

Q

Let me have you pause for a moment

A

Mr

When you said

after he was mirandized, what do you mean by that'

Lamoreaux while you were at the jail

Where were you when

you had that discussion'

1

He was given his Miranda warnings indicating, you

I spoke with all three
Let's talk about your discussion with

A

1

I was at the booking desk, which is if you go into

the jail, you go into the sally port, you go in the front door

know, his right to remain silent and that anything that he

I

9

mentioned to me could be used against him m

j

10

there's several computers there where -- that we use in order

11

to put the information m

Q

Okay

court

So after you advised him of those warnings,

on each individual that's brought

12

into the jail

13

A

Yes, sir

13

time

14

Q

Okay

14

four -- three feet at the most from where I was next to the

15

A

He at that point basically denied any involvement

15

computer

12

you asked him what was going on'

1

And will you describe that discussion'

16

He didn't know what was going on, had no knowledge that it was

17

actually methamphetamme in the vehicle

18

opinion played completely innocent of anything

19

Q

Okay

Basically m

my

j

17
18

Did you make any other arrests that night'

He was actually sitting right next to me at the

I was at the computer

He wasn't more than three,

Q

Okay

And what did you say to him'

A

At that point I was talking to him just like a friend

or friends would talk to each other, having a conversation

19

about the situation and circumstances

based on the information that I had gained from the people that

I tried to tell him

20

A

I did

20

21

Q

Who did you arrest?

21

he was involved with, that he was m

22

A

Suzanne Ruesch was arrested and also Amber Coutts

22

know, it was basically --it was better for him to be honest

23

Q

Who was the passenger'

23

and let me know what was going on

24

A

Yes, sir

again, that he was involved in any kind of distribution issue

25

Q

Okay

at the scene, b^tJgj£efitualJ-V--he_did make some incriminating

Were any of these people taken to the Utah
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

And he initially denied,

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

statements

1

Q

2

Now, let me ask you real quick

a lot of trouble, and, you

Did you take any

written statements from any of the people while you were at the

3

scene'

4

Q

You can refer to it to refresh your memory, but

please don't read from it
A

Okay

He did admit that he was involved in making

the arrangements to distribute methamphetamme.

A

I did

5

Q

And did he use those words'

Q

And who was that from'

6

A

He probably did not use those specific words

A

Ms

7

Q

Do you recall roughly what he said'

Q

Did you inform Mr

A

To -- to be honest, to the best of my recollection,

Ruesch specifically
Lamoreaux that you had a written

A

I did

He was actually right there when she was

actually writing it out
Q

8
9

statement'

Okay

So when you were discussing this with him at

10

Q

How did he indicate to you that he had been involved'

11

A

He -- he eventually saidfxeah, you know, I -- you're

12
13

the jail, he knew there was this statement?
A

Yeah, he saw her writing it out

14

Q

Okay

15

You mentioned after you advised him that it

might be better for him to be honest and cooperate that__he made

16

some admissions

17

A

I will

Will you describe what he said?
Initially, he would - - h e kept asking me,

Why am I here, why am I here?
know, I wasn't involved m

I -- I didn't do anything

You

any of this

And then I would -- I told him, Tim, you know, I've
got all this information

You know, just come clean and tell

me -- tell me what's going on, you know
And at that point, \a£cording to my reportt I
•.r^-i,-at-ori hprp -- if I can refer to that'

I -- I can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said

right^}
Q

Okay

And did he say anything else?

A

You know, to be honest, I can't remember exactly what

he said (after that J>
Q

Okay

So did he say anything about making phone

calls to Suzanne Ruesch'

18

A

19

Q

What did he state'

20

A

He indicated to me initially that he was on his cell

21
22
23

Yes

phone and that he had contacted Suzanne Ruesch
Q

Did he state what the purpose of contacting her was'

A

To be honest, and it's not in my -- as far as I can

see in my report
Q

If I can refer to it real quick'

That's fine

83

A

1
2

I don't see that I included in my report exactly what

Q

3

Okay.

That's fine.

walked up?

6

Did he say anything about that?
A

Q

12

He indicated that it wasn't what I thought

Your Honor, I think the witness has

said.

Did he say whose cell phone it

If he read from the report, he would simply be reading

from the report, which would be hearsay.

Did he say why he was handing her a cell phone?
Or let me back up.

10
11

MR. KING:

testified that he doesn't have a memory of what was actually

it was, that he was actually only handing her a cell phone.

9

Because he can utilize it for the

purpose of refreshing his memory.

"?ou said you saw b.im handing something to somebody.

He did.

Well, it depends on whether or not

there's an objection.

5

7

Can I refer to my report and read that specifically?
THE COURT:

Did he say anything about what you saw when you

4

8

A

he mentioned in the phone call --or conversation.

He's read the report.
remember what was said.

He's testified that he can't

I would say that it's been shown that

the report is not able to refresh his memory.

was?
A

I can't remember if he -- if he said that it was

Therefore, it

would be inadmissible.

13

actually his cell phone or whose cell phone it was.

14

it in his possession, and I -- I do believe that it was his

whether or not reading the report -- whether it does, in fact,

15

cell phone.

refresh his memory.

16

Q

Okay.

But he had

And did he say anything about what the

17

conversation was about that he was having on the phone as he

18

handed it to Ms. Ruesch?

19
20

A

23

Q

it.

Okay.

he had been involved with this drug deal?

24

A

Let me refer to my report one more time, please.

25

Q

That's fine.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

The next question is

If it does, then he can make reference to

it relates to it and the objection would be sustained.
MR. PERKINS:

Okay.

MR. PERKINS:

Q.

Does that report refresh your

memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?
A

What about what he said indicated to you that

I don't know.

If it doesn't, then he has no independent recollection as

If I remember right, I don't know that he actually

told me what the conversation was initially that --as far as

21/. the cell phone.
22-)

THE COURT:

Q

( T o b e h o n e s t , no, it doesn' t^>
Okay.

Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he

changed his stories, from initially denying any involvement and
then admitting to you that he was involved?
A

Not that I recall.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

